

Web Services Security Standards Forum

Dr. Phillip M. Hallam-Baker C.Eng. FBCS VeriSign Inc.



Web Services Security Standards For 'Um

For 'um: Meeting to tell people that everyone agrees on an issue

• Walk the Walk or just Talk the Talk?



VeriSign is For 'um

- Provider of Web Services
 - XKMS Service live over 1 year
 - Trust Service Integration Kit
- User of Web Services
 - Integrate multiple IT infrastructures
 - VeriSign
 - Signio
 - Network Solutions
 - Illuminet
 - HO Systems

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Why Everyone is For'um

Web Services like email

 Anyone can talk to everyone Not like Power Cord

- Different Mains Adapter for Every Device
- \$600 service fee to repair broken connector





Don't want our Power Cords [Web Services] to catch Fire



Why Are We All For'um?

- Standards Benefits
 - Interoperability
 - Vendor Independence
 - Clearly Defined Intellectual Property Constraints
- Standards should be enablers, not limiters

 Don't complain if companies don't wait for standards to catch up

VeriSign Why Web Services Security is a Challenge





Theory:


This thing has 4 wheel drive But we only take it to the Mall Practice: In this environment we <u>need</u> 4 wheel drive



Why Security Is Needed

Without Trust and Security... Web Services are Dead on Arrival

VeriSign Web Services Security Groups




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And Don't Forget...

- Web Services Institute
 - Standards are great
 - Interoperability is better
 - Need Profiles, Testing, etc.
- UDDI
 - Protocol specification now in OASIS
- www.XMLTrustCenter.org
 - Web Services Security Community
- Internet Engineering Task Force
 - Mainly focused on lower protocol stack layers

What Parts of Web Services Security Should Be Infrastructure?




What Parts of Web Services Security Should Be Infrastructure?

- Replicate security context provided by O/S
 - Protected Memory
 - Prevents modification of process state
 - Prevents interception of function calls
 - Prevent disclosure
 - Access Control
 - Authentication
 - Authorization
 - Auditing

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
Problem Space






Solution Space

Applications






VeriSign Part I – XML Infrastructure

VeriSign XML Signature & Encryption

- Allow node level security enhancements
 - Sign parts of a document
 - Enveloped signature is inside signed node
 - Detached signature signs referenced content
 - Detached encryption data
- Operate on the XML InfoSet
 - Not just a stream of bits

XML Signature Operates on the InfoSet not Just Bits



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VeriSign Part II – Web Services Security Infrastructure



Is SSL Enough?

- For some applications
 - Yes
- As Infrastructure
 - No
 - SSL Only supports data in transit, not in storage
 - SSL does not support multi-party transactions
 - SSL is all or nothing
 - Messages are opaque to firewalls
 - SSL does not support non-Repudiation





- SOAP Message Level Security
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Authentication
- Builds on XML Standards

– XML Signature & Encryption

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Completing the Picture

- Request / Response Correlation
 - Prevent Message Substitution Attacks
 - Response Modification
 - Response Replay
- Request Replay
- Denial of Service

VeriSign Part III Web Services Infrastructure Security Applications

- Key Management
 - XKMS
 - Key Agreement TBA
- Distributed Access Control
 - SAML
 - XACML
 - XrML
- Ancillary
 - Provisioning [SPML]
 - Biometrics [XCBF]
 - Privacy Profile [P3P]



XML Key Management Specification (XKMS)


- Management of Public Keys
 - Because all you need to know to communicate securely with anyone is their public key
 - Registration
 - Alice registers her email signature public key
 - [Alice might later request reissue, revocation, recovery]
 - Information
 - Bob looks up the key for alice@somecorp.com
 - Bob checks to see if it is valid
- Core Objective:
 - Shield the client from the complexity of PKI

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Distributed Access Control

- Authorization Decision
 - Can 'Alice' access the general ledger?
- Authentication
 - Is 'Alice' the real Alice?
- Attributes
 - Alice is a Finance department employee
- Authorization Policy
 - Finance department employees may access the general ledger.


Distributed Access Control




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
VeriSign SAML Authentication Statements



VeriSign SAML Authorization Decision and Attribute Statements

Authorization

Authority



Why Standardize Authorization Policy?

- Support common Authorization Policy API
- Move policy with controlled object
 - Privacy Applications

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- Healthcare (HIPPA)
- EU Privacy Directive
- Digital Rights Management

XML Access Control Markup Language

- Allows Access Control Policy to be expressed
- Encode in XML rules such as:

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- 1. A person may read any record for which he or she is the designated patient.
- 2. A person may read any record for which he or she is the designated parent or guardian, and for which the patient is under 16 years of age.
- 3. A physician may write any medical element for which he or she is the designated primary care physician, provided an email is sent to the patient,
- 4. An administrator shall not be permitted to read or write medical elements of a patient record.
- Chief standards issue is naming
 - How to identify 'patient', 'record', 'guardian' etc.





- Allows Digital Rights Policy to be expressed at each level in the value chain
 - Encode in XML rules such as:
 - Consumer can view film 6 times within 6 months
 - Consumer can view any content in super subscription plan for 1 month
 - Consumer can listen to audio track X on the devices P, Q, R.
 - Content Owner can define distributors and their respective rights on the content
- Chief standards issue is naming
 - How to identify content, constraints etc.




- Proposals on or near the table to address:
 - Support for Direct Trust
 - WSDL Description of Security Enhancements
- Why not now?
 - Need to standardize dependencies first
 - Maintain focus, momentum on existing work



Support for Direct Trust

• It can't be turtles *all* the way down.





WSDL Description of Security Enhancements

- We know what to do
 - WSDL description of security enhancements
 - I support WS-Security with AES Encryption
 - The authentication key of my service is X
 - I always authenticate responses with Y
 - You must perform key agreement with Z
- Specification is dependent on:
 - WSDL specification
 - Web Services Security Specifications



Conclusions

- Without Security and Trust:
 Web Services are Dead On Arrival
- Considerable progress has already been made
 - Industry wide consensus on value of standards
 - Basic Infrastructure is in place or in development
 - There is considerable consensus on the roadmap
 - Security need not be the show stopper



Time to Say: I'm For 'um

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